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Abstract
Detecting evidence of genetic engineering in the wild is a problem of growing importance
for biosecurity, provenance, and intellectual property rights. This thesis describes
a computational system designed to detect engineering from DNA sequencing of
biological samples and presents its performance on fully blinded test data. The
pipeline builds on existing computational resources for metagenomics, including
methods that use the full set of reference genomes deposited in GenBank. Starting
from raw reads generated from short-read sequencers, the dominant host species are
identified by k-mer analysis. Next, all the sequencing reads are mapped to the imputed
host strain; those reads that do not map are retained as suspicious. Suspicious reads
are de novo assembled to suspicious contigs, followed by sequence alignment against
the NCBI non-redundant nucleotide database to annotate the engineered sequence
and to identify whether the engineering is in a plasmid or is integrated into the host
genome. Our initial system applied to blinded samples provides excellent identification
of foreign gene content, the changes most likely to be functional. We have less ability
to detect functional structural variants and small indels and SNPs produced by genetic
engineering but which are more difficult to distinguish from natural variation. Future
work will focus on improved methods for detecting synonymous recoding, used to
introduce watermarks and for compatibility with synthesis and assembly methods,
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1.1 Background of the study
Genetic engineering and synthetic biology focus on technologies that deliver foreign
genes into host organisms to introduce desired new functions as well as to understand
the function of the native genome. For decades, the U.S. government has been funding
synthetic biology research to develop genetically engineered organisms in order to
expand application and boost production across industries such as agriculture, phar-
maceuticals, and biofuels. While this has considerable benefits, deliberate misuse or
release of engineered organisms can pose threats to human health and the environment.
As a result, challenges regarding both ethics and safety arise — if an engineered
organism is deliberately released into the environment, how can we tell it apart from
the millions of microorganisms that exist naturally in the wild?
Our group is funded by the US Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(IARPA) under their Finding Engineering-Linked Indicators (FELIX) program as
part of an effort led by Raytheon BBN Technologies (BBN). BBN terms this effort
GUARDIAN (Guard for Uncovering Accidental Release, Detecting Intentional Alter-
ations, and Nefariousness), an initiative that combines wet-lab and computational
analyses. As part of this multidisciplinary collaborative project led by BBN, we aim to
improve the ability to detect engineered organisms and enable a new era of synthetic
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biology focused on safety and efficacy.
The IARPA program also funds Testing and Evaluation groups that generate
fully blinded data from real organisms, both native and genetically engineered. Most
of the initial data has been generated using Illumina short-read DNA sequencing
data, but Nanopore and PacBio long-read DNA sequencing data will be generated
in increasing volume to increase throughput and sensitivity for detection. According
to Gargis et al. (2019) [1], short-read sequencing technologies have lower error rates
than long-read technologies, which makes short-read sequencing particularly useful for
microbial strain matching and single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) identification
[2, 3]. However, the disadvantage is that the read length (100-300 nt) is too short to
resolve repetitive regions or structural variants, and their de novo assemblies often
result in contigs with many gaps [3, 4]. Long-read sequences can span more than
10 kilobases (kb) in length, which makes them effective for closing the gaps in the
scaffolds [3]. Unfortunately, long reads have higher error rates [5] and suffer from
insertions and deletions (indels) in homopolymeric regions [2, 6]. It is also difficult to
accurately assemble small plasmids (<7 kb) from PacBio long-read because shorter
reads will typically be down-selected from library preparation and data analysis [7,
8]. While IARPA’s assessment strategy favors an initial focus on short-reads, the
complementary characteristics of the two types of sequencing data available motivates
an ultimate desire to develop a detection system that combines short- and long-read
data in order to generate high-quality hybrid assemblies [3, 4, 9, 10] and more accurate
detection of engineering.
This thesis describes a semi-automated cross-platform pipeline, the “JHU pipeline”
in the context of the BBN GUARDIAN system, that detects evidence of genetic
engineering. We aimed to develop a generalizable methods requiring no training data
beyond native genomes deposited in GenBank. We note that other groups within the
BBN group pursued machine learning approaches using engineered and non-engineered
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training sets. Our hypothesis was that classifiers based on training sets of engineered
genomes would suffer from large generalization error, performing well on the relatively
small body of positive training examples but degrading when applied to novel examples.
Comparisons of our generalizable system to the other BBN system, provided in the
results, support this hypothesis. It is our sincere hope that our efforts will contribute
to the diverse computational analytics developed in addressing growing challenges in
the field of synthetic biology.
1.2 Statement of the problem
A genetically modified organism (GMO) can be created using multiple techniques.
Traditional methods of genetic engineering insert genes of interest randomly into the
host organism’s genome via a suitable vector. Technology advances in gene targeting
and gene editing have allowed genes to be delivered at specific locations more accurately.
Since 2009, gene editing has made major breakthroughs, with Transcription Activator-
Like Effector Nucleases (TALENs) and the CRISPR-Cas9-gRNA (guide RNA) system
developed and commonly used in research and industry alike. Therefore, as the
capability of genome-wide engineering techniques is rapidly growing, bioanalytical
as well as computational tools must catch up with the growing need to distinguish
naturally occurring organisms from those that are engineered.
Before discussing detection of engineering in cells, we note that the availability
of synthetic biology resources has made it important to check DNA sequence orders
for potentially dangerous sequences, such as those encoding pathogens or toxins. At
present, identification of target nucleic acid sequences from a list of dangerous sequences
relies heavily on exhaustive alignment via BLAST [11], or other related techniques for
biosynthesis screening, such as the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC)’s
“Harmonized Screening Protocol” [12]. In screening for detection, typical standards
are approximately 80% sequence similarity with a length of at least 200 bp [13].
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Sequences shorter than 200 bp have been difficult to classify accurately as native
versus engineered, or similarly as mapping to a pathogenic versus non-pathogenic
strain [13]. Methods have been designed to search for specific sequences that are often
used for engineering [14], including recombination sites and selectable markers, but
these are limited to known examples and can be evaded by newer synthetic biology
techniques for scarless editing. Moreover, the set of known signatures should have a
broader scale to include specific signatures for different organisms: yeast, bacterial,
mammalian, or other hosts.
In physical samples, detection of genetic alterations in GMOs commonly identifies
target nucleic acid sequences that are previously known. One of the wet-lab approaches
is by Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), which has seen wide use for GMO detection
[15]. The principle behind this method is to design a pair of primers that bind, in
reverse complementary fashion, to regions that flank specific sequence of interest.
Then going through controlled PCR cycles, the target sequence is amplified. The PCR
products are subjected to electrophoresis, which separates the products by length. If
the fragment amplified has the expected length, then it is presumably not engineered.
For a specific locus, different primer sets may be designed for the native and the
engineered versions, with either presence/absence or length as a read-out. Other
methods are possible, such as Southern blotting or brute-force sequencing.
This PCR approach for physical samples is analogous to the methods for screening
DNA sequence orders: both rely on a curated list of DNA signatures of engineering.
This requirement for pre-existing knowledge is an intrinsic disadvantages of the PCR
detection method. It certainly does not serve well in GMOs that are modified using
modern-day gene editing techniques, like the CRIPR-Cas system. Rather than PCR,
the low costs of next-generation sequencing (NGS) have made full genome sequencing
a viable approach for engineering detection.
This thesis describes methods that use whole-genome sequencing data as a source
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of evidence of genetics engineering. Other members of the BBN consortium, and
other teams funded by IARPA, started by re-purposing existing genome annotation
pipelines, attempting to build high-quality full genome assemblies. We viewed this
as wasteful: even in an engineered genome, only a small fraction of the bases are
engineered, perhaps only 10 kb in a typical 5-10 Mb bacterial or fungal genome. We
took a different approach, unique across the IARPA teams, to first filter out native
and near-native reads, and only then attempt to analyze the (hopefully) small fraction
of suspicious reads.
Phase 1 of the IARPA FELIX program concluded in October 2019 with a challenge
to detect engineering in blinded samples from four yeast species: Saccharomyces
cerevisiae, Yarrowia lipolytica, Komagataella pastoris, and Komagataella phaffii. This
thesis primarily discusses what we achieved by the end of Phase 1. Limitations are
followed in later sections and are the subject of ongoing work. The JHU pipeline
described here has the ability to analyze sequencing data generated from mixtures
of multiple species including engineered and non-engineered strains, with minimal
meta-data needed (it is helpful to know, for example, whether sequencing standards
such as PhiX have been spiked in as controls). The pipeline employs several best-
performing and widely cited molecular sequence analysis tools developed in other labs
at JHU. Removing reads that are native to the host organism as soon as possible
and then assembling the suspicious reads only reduces computational requirements
substantially. Compared to other groups within BBN that focused on machine
learning (e.g. Hidden Markov Model) or deep learning (e.g. Neural Network for
Natural Language Processing), the JHU pipeline extracts features by annotating them
using NCBI non-redundant databases. In Phase 1, semi-automated annotation was
performed to classify these features as native vs. engineered; full automation of this
step is underway.
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1.3 Objectives of the pipeline
We aim to identify foreign gene content (extrachromosomal plasmid vs integrated),
structural variants (breakpoints, amplifications, deletions), non-synonymous editing,
synonymous recoding (watermarks, restriction enzyme site addition or subtraction,
codon optimization, codon minimization), and other engineering markers in DNA
sequencing data from pure strains and mixtures.
These performance objectives are summarized by the mnemonic GRAIP.
Generalization. Generalize readily to multiple species and mixed or diluted
samples.
Re-use. Rely on top-of-class implementations of unit operations for biological
sequence analysis.
Automation. Design towards a system that permits beginning-to-end automation.
Interpretation. Make decisions that a person can interpret.




to detect evidence of genetic
engineering
2.1 Introduction
Conventional genetic engineering integrate DNA elements into the host genome via
techniques such as homologous recombination for nuclear integration or transformation
or transfection for plasmids. Two general considerations are the type of sequence intro-
duced and the method used to synthesize, assemble, and integrate the target sequence
into the plasmid or genome. If the introduced sequence is foreign, for example a
foreign gene, the resulting combination of DNA sequences does not occur naturally and
therefore can be readily detected via site-specific PCR-based methods targeting if the
insertion site or the insert is known. Modifications that do not introduce foreign genes
are also readily introduced, especially since gene editing and other related techniques
have been added to the engineering toolbox. These more subtle modifications can
entirely resemble natural mutations or gene polymorphisms but nevertheless achieve
intended functional changes, such as functional knock-out or unregulated activation.
Therefore, improved analytical tools for detection, identification, and quantification of
such GMOs are needed.
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The second consideration, the method used to synthesize, assemble, and integrate,
in the past placed constraints on the DNA sequences flanking an engineered region.
These constraints, for example requirements for the presence or absence of restriction
enzyme recognition sites, are often termed “scars”, and at one time provided additional
evidence of engineering. With the advent of methods such as homologous recombination
and CRISPR/Cas9 editing, however, scarless editing is much more feasible and scars
can be avoided. Scarless editing is therefore an additional challenge for detection.
In this chapter, we will review existing and proposed detection and identification
methods for various types of engineering, with a focus on the use of bioinformatics and
other computational approaches. Then we will investigate several gaps in the literature
that our JHU pipeline aims to address. These gaps motivated the performance
objectives denoted by the mnemonic GRAIP in the preceding chapter: generalization,
re-use, automation, interpretation, performance.
2.2 Targeted DNA Amplification-Based Methods
A standard PCR-based method to detect genetic engineering requires knowing the
target DNA sequence of the modified locus, so that a pair of primers that are
complementary to the sites flanking the locus of interest can be designed accordingly.
The resulting molecular constructs, with the addition of a suitable polymerase, undergo
cyclic DNA replication to amplify the intended product. Because PCR-based detection
methods are highly sensitive and specific, PCR-based detection remains a leading
method for known targets [16].
How about shorter sequence modifications, such as those induced by genome
editing techniques such as site-directed nuclease systems (SDN) 1, 2, and 3 [17]?
Shorter sequence changes (substitutions or indels of one or a few nucleotides) are
also detectable using specific probes, for instance TaqMan real-time-PCR or digital
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PCR [18]. SNP genotyping approaches can be applied to detect very small sequence
differences of a few nucleotides, given an adequate reference sequence [19, 20].
These bioanalytical detection approaches have continued to improve. They are most
valuable when a large number of biospecimens are to be assayed for a small number
of pre-defined targets. This remains a limitation — PCR and related techniques are
only able to detect a small subset of targets with known sequence. For the efforts
devoted in the FELIX project, we aim to achieve similar goals for unknown targets
by using sequencing data instead. The resulting computational system will be more
generalizable to detect a wider range of engineering.
2.3 Untargeted DNA Sequencing-Based Methods
Next-generation sequencing (NGS) technologies takes advantage of massive parallel
sequencing for the whole genome, therefore boosting the speed and decreasing the cost.
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) has become increasingly feasible as an analytical
approach for GMO detection. It requires no prior information of a specific genetic
alteration, or even of the host species, and thus can be applied readily as an untargeted
detection approach for generic alterations [16]. NGS platforms produce millions of
DNA sequencing reads in parallel.
Traditional methods use the raw sequence output as input to traditional genome
sequencing pipelines that perform assembly (either de novo or with the assistance of
a reference genome) and then compare the result to high-quality reference genomes
using bioinformatics software.
The comparison between de novo genome assemblies and a well-annotated reference
has its own complications. Even without engineering, a substantial amount of sequence
differences are to be expected due to natural genome diversity within strains of the same
species. Distinguishing sequence polymorphisms from true engineering is therefore a
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critical task. Furthermore, another challenge of WGS is that highly repetitive regions
in the genome can be difficult to assemble, and even difficult to assign if multiple species
with similar repeats are present in a single sample. Flanking an engineered region
with native repeats, for example, can be very effective in obfuscating its location. Also
considering heterogeneous or contaminated samples, WGS might find its limitations in
separating sequences that are discrete in their genetic coordinates. Finally, assembly
itself can introduce errors that might resemble engineering, for example non-native
junctions that appear chimeric in connecting DNA from different species present in a
single sample.
If the resulting genome assembly reveal foreign DNA sequences, it is possible that
the genetic modification was introduced by either genome editing or conventional
genetic engineering. However, due to sequence homology shared among multiple
organisms, WGS approaches are prone to false positives and often confounded by
sequences not only from the target organism but also from a wide array of contaminants
or pathogens [16]. Furthermore, gene content can vary widely across different strains
of a single species, and many such genes may be absent from the reference strain or
even the full complement of strains with sequenced genomes. Therefore, detected
sequences that are not present in a reference genome or previously sequenced genomes
must be carefully evaluated, or experimentally verified if needed, to assess whether
they are native or engineered.
Beyond detecting what was introduced or engineered, it is also desirable to detect
how it was introduced: classic genetic engineering, genome editing, genome synthesis,
or even mutagenesis and selection. These hopes are becoming more and more futile.
Modifications introduced by conventional mutagenesis techniques, such as irradiation
or mutagenic chemicals as well as genome editing applications, do not leave specific
imprints in the genome. Classic genetic engineering using restriction enzymes is
decreasing as newer scarless editing becomes easier. If the genes coding for the genome
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editing components are absent, it cannot be deduced from the altered sequence
which specific process has been used. Even for the conventional genetic engineering
techniques, it may be impossible to unequivocally identify the underlying technique
for the integration of foreign DNA [16]. For these reasons, distinguishing between
conventional genetic engineering and genome editing or identifying the process of
genetic engineering is difficult.
2.4 Bioinformatics and Statistical Methods
In Lusser et al. (2011) [21], the minimum length of a unique random sequence in a
genome was calculated by correlating the genome size with the possible number of
combinations for this sequence length. For example in a plant genome, it reports a
DNA sequence of at least 20 nt is needed to be considered as unique. However, the
probability calculation for theoretical uniqueness is based on the naive assumption that
the four bases, A, C, G, and T, are equally distributed and statistically independent.
The complexity of alteration, the amount of repetition, and the diversity of genomes
are not taken into account. This piece of information, however, might provide insights
into how long a DNA sequence we should reliably call for a foreign gene content in
terms of an insertion of longer sequences.
The integration of nucleic acid sequences from foreign organisms can also occur
naturally, although rarely, as seen in the sweet potato, which was shown to contain
Agrobacterium genes [22]. In most cases, a sequence of foreign origin can be detected
if it has sufficient length. This enables identification of more complicated pathway
insertions, typically consecutive foreign genetic elements comprising a combination of
promoter, coding sequence, and terminator from different species. For this purpose,
search packages like BLAST or k-mer based tools like NIKS [23] can be used to find
such DNA elements in WGS data.
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A European study applied NGS data to characterize transgenic insertions in GMOs
[24]. The reference genome for Oryza sativa ssp. japonica was input for the Illumina
“Consensus Assessment of Sequence and Variation” (CASAVA) software (Elandv2e),
which reported all DNA polymorphisms (SNPs, insertions, deletions and breakpoints)
between the rice reference genome and the reads obtained for the LLRice62 DNA
sample. CASAVA’s Elandv2e generated 5′- and 3′-borders of inserted sequences at
the breakpoints (breakpoint border sequences) by collecting orphan reads, defined as
reads that do not map to the reference genome but have a mate read that maps to the
reference genome at regions that flank a breakpoint. For each breakpoint, orphan reads
were collected and de novo assembled to breakpoint border sequences. To distinguish
between natural insertions and insertions caused by transformation of the native
genome, all breakpoint border sequences larger than 30 bp were compared against
a plant transformation vector (pCAMBIA-1300) using MegaBLAST algorithm [25].
The result was promising — one breakpoint on chromosome 6 was identified in the
LLRice62 sample as a putative insertion site, with a left breakpoint border sequence
of 79 bp and a right breakpoint border sequence of 275 bp exhibiting homology to the
transformation vector. This is in complete agreement with the information provided
by the LLRice62 breeding company (EFSA 2007).
Essentially orphan reads correspond to reads only at the breakpoint, because
to qualify it must have a mate read that maps to the native reference. These two
paired-end reads are within the same fragment so that they should be close enough to
each other. Assembly of the orphan reads result in contigs covering either flank of the
inserted region, but not the middle if the insertion is larger than a single read length
100 bp. This means that this approach is unable to detect transgenic insertions less
than 100 bp, but hardly can such short sequence produce any important functions.
Based on this effort, we would like to extend the underlying methods to investigate
not only the breakpoint border sequence but the whole sequence within the inserted
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region. More importantly, we would like to generalize such approach to deal with
GMOs beyond the domain of food and crops.
Statistical methods are also appropriate for detecting synonymous recoding. The
more common type of synonymous recoding is to optimize codon usage for high
protein expression when moving a protein-coding sequence across species. Usually
the foreign gene content is already easier to detect than the more subtle changes in
codon usage, however. This can be phrased more quantitatively by noting that the
information content or Shannon entropy of an amino acid is much larger than the
conditional entropy of a codon given its amino acid, averaged over amino acids. Two
less common types of synonymous recoding involve codon minimization, in which
certain codons are eliminated from a genome to permit an enlarged genetic code
encoding unnatural amino acids, and watermarks, in which synonymous recoding is
used to introduce detectable signatures or perhaps to encode hidden information with
DNA steganography. Codon minimization is easy to detect given WGS sequence,
although it is more difficult in shorter sequences. Watermarks that are contiguous
may be detectable if they are sufficiently long and different from native sequences.
Distributed watermarks, for example a unique haplotype constructed from natural
alleles scattered along a chromosome, can be impossible to detect statistically.
2.5 Considerations
As discussed above, targeted and untargeted detection methods are useful in comple-
mentary scenarios: targeted approaches may be favored when the engineered sequences
or loci are known, and untargeted methods become essential when these are unknown.
Since deep sequencing data is relatively unbiased and agnostic as to the type of
engineering, the untargeted approach is more easy to generalize to detect combinations
of engineering and to unforeseen types of engineering. Some types of engineering
may be difficult to impossible to detect versus the native background, for example
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distributed watermarks or small indels that could occur naturally and have functional
consequences.
In the realm of WGS approaches, perhaps the the biggest limitation is for methods
that require use of a reference genome or require a wide array of native genomes to
build a model for natural variation. Usually, any species that is a possible host for
genetic engineering already has well-characterized genetics, at least one high-quality
reference genome, and an increasing number of well-annotated diversity strains. Even
as the number of diversity strains increases, however, genome comparative approaches
remain unlikely to be definitive in describing a DNA sequence as engineered merely
because it does not occur in any of the known strains (provided, of course, that the
sequence also does not match the DNA sequence or protein sequence of a foreign
source).
What if we don’t know which reference genome or genomes to use? Luckily, given
sufficient NGS coverage, this problem is within the domain of meta-genomics and
environmental genomics. Meta-genomics refers the study of genetic material recovered
directly from environmental samples. Meta-genomics has established methods for
inferring the species present in an environmental sample that are applicable to host
inference in the context of detecting GMOs as well. We will describe how we have
used these methods to infer host species in blinded samples, and then use available
sequence data for these inferred hosts as part of further analysis.
Another consideration is computational performance. Broadly speaking, systems
that take NGS data can be divided into (1) read-first (2) assembly-first approaches.
Namely, read-first approaches first match the reads to some references, either by
alignment or by k-mer analysis, whereas assembly-first approaches first assemble the
reads to contigs, essentially reproducing a genome assembly pipeline and then compare.
The method used in Wahler et al. (2013) [24] is considered a read-first approach.
In the literature there have been insufficient studies that compare the classification
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performance of read-first vs. assembly-first methods. However, even for an engineered
sample, the sequences are still predominately native. And the native reads really
just provide information about the native background host, not whether it has been
engineered. Finally, assembly errors themselves can create spurious sequences or
non-native junctions that may appear to be evidence of engineering. These errors are
more likely if an entire genome assembly is attempted, rather than just assembly of a
small number of reads that are marked as suspicious. Consequently, discarding native
reads early should both reduce computational burden and also increase classification
accuracy.
2.6 Summary
Several DNA-based procedures are suitable for detection of various types of engineering.
For the targeted PCR-based methods, sequence information of the modified locus
is indispensable. For the untargeted WGS-based methods focusing on sequence
differences, a robust reference genome is helpful. Combined approaches of the two
might work well — once a difference is revealed, this knowledge may be used to develop
a targeted PCR-based detect method to further confirm the identity of the suspicious
content or detect it in new samples.
Detecting conventional genetic engineering, where transgenic elements are fused
by promoters or terminators with target sequence in between, is quite feasible. But
there are also challenges: for genome edited sites that do not carry foreign DNA
traces as screening targets, detection and identification methods are limited; for
genome sequence difference between a genome assembly and a reference genome, it is
often difficult to tell if it is because of assembly artifacts, natural mutations, or real
engineering; for identification of how the engineering was done, it is nearly impossible





IARPA enlisted Testing and Evaluation (T&E) groups to perform genetic engineering
on fungal species and generate DNA-Seq data provided as 50 blinded DNA-Seq data
sets. We were to (1) classify each sample as native vs. engineered and (2) if engineered,
report the host species, the type of engineering, and the and evidence, including
the engineered sequence, whether it resided on a plasmid or was integrated, and if
integrated the location relative to the host reference genome. Each sequencing data
set had approximately 30x coverage by Illumina short-read paired-end sequence, with
a read length of 300 nt and an insert size of 400-500 bp, with the paired ends reads
often overlapping. Along with the Illumina short reads, T&E also provided Nanopore
long reads for a subset of samples. Given the high coverage of the short reads, our
Phase 1 pipeline focused on analyzing the short-read data, with long read analysis
deferred for planned future work in Phase 2.
3.2 Identifying the host strain
Our first step was to determine the host strain or strains that might exist in our
sequencing data. Although a standard mapping approach could work for this purpose,
this is computationally expensive. Alternative mapping-free methods that instead
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use k-mer matching are much more computationally efficient, without much loss of
accuracy for host strain identification (personal communication, Steven Salzberg and
Ben Langmead). We then tested one such method, Kraken2 [26, 27], using default
parameters. This software first builds a k-mer hash table from GenBank genomes
with known taxonomic classification, where the key is the minimizer of the k-mer
and the value is NCBI Taxonomic Identifier (taxon ID). Kraken2’s performance is
boosted through several mechanisms. First, the 31-mer minimizers are themselves
spaced seeds of 35-mers. Second, these minimizers are used to create a sketch of the
true 35-mer distribution. These improvements allow Kraken2 to run with a small
memory footprint and faster operation.
The output of Kraken2 is a taxonomic classification of every continuous 35-mer
subsequence within a read. Each genome containing that unique k-mer is identified,
and the subsequence is then annotated to the least common taxonomic ancestor and
assigned a taxon ID. This resulting assignment might correspond to an individual
strain if the k-mer happens to be unique to that strain. Otherwise the assignment is
made at the lowest taxonomic category in which the k-mer is unique: species, genus,
or higher level category. The special taxon ‘0’ is reserved for k-mers that do not map
to any known sequences. For the choice of databases, we used NCBI non-redundant
nucleotide database (nt) together with the vector and plasmid database (UniVec) to
build Kraken2 k-mer indices.
Initially, we intended to use the Kraken2 output to not only detect the native
host but also to remove sequences that are perfect match to a native host. When we
attempted this, however, we ran into difficulties in interpreting the mapping from
k-mers to taxon ID’s. For example, how many 0’s in a row as a cutoff would we require
to call a sequence non-native? What should we do with long foreign gene content
where short reads would be entirely within the foreign gene? These could map perfectly
to the source organism, yet we do not want to remove them without checking that
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the organism’s entire genome was present, rather than just an isolated gene without
whole genome context. How should we account structural variations or breakpoints,
which correspond to rearrangements within the native genome? Additional issues arise
because a single nucleotide variant and breakpoint both affect all the k-mers within
the 35 nt window, even though they are very different types of variation.
After encountering these difficulties, we decided to split apart host species iden-
tification from read subtraction: for host species identification, k-mer matching is
sufficient, but for read subtraction, mapping is required. Speed-ups are still possible
for read subtraction, though, because a custom database can be built for the dominant
host inferred from k-mer analysis. To determine the dominant species, the read-level
analysis of Kraken2 can be used as input for companion software Bracken [28],
which performs Bayesian re-estimation of species abundance, and all higher levels of
taxonomy hierarchy as requested by the user, at the sample level. We therefore used
Bracken post-processing to identify the host dominant species for each sample. We
classified each sample at species and genus level, and simply chose the organism which
has the highest abundance as host.
Our annotation of the dominant host species was correct in every case. Some
samples contained mixtures of multiple hosts. For these, our Phase 2 plans are to run
species identification and read subtraction (described immediately below) iteratively,
identifying the major species and their relative frequencies in the sample.
3.3 Mapping-based subtraction of native reads
Our second step was to align the reads against the host reference genomes, and then
remove reads that were presumably native based on high sequence identity with the
reference. We anticipated that it would take too long and too much memory to map
against a non-redundant database using any existing aligner. By determining the host
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species first, we saved computational resources by mapping only to that single host
species, rather than to a much larger non-redundant database.
We downloaded the best-quality genome assemblies for the identified species,
labeled as either the “reference” or “representative” in the RefSeq section of GenBank.
We used one of the best-performing aligners, Bowtie2 [29], for mapping the reads to the
reference. Although HISAT2 is a newer version of this read-mapper, it was optimized
for mammalian applications rather than for fungal and bacterial applications, for which
Bowtie2 remains well-suited (B. Langmead, personal communication). For paired-end
reads, native read-pairs were defined as read-pairs that mapped either concordantly
(perfect match to native) or discordantly (sequences match native but with a different
distance or orientation, suggesting a structural variation). These native read-pairs
were filtered out. In future research, we plan to investigate by retaining the discordant
pairs as evidence of structural variation. For reads where neither end mapped, we
kept both ends as suspicious. For reads where a single end mapped and the other
end did not map, we kept only the non-mapping end as suspicious. Although keeping
both ends may provide greater sequence context for the native region from the host if
the purposed engineering is integrated, we found in the end that our choice of keeping
only the non-mapping read gave a sufficiently long native flanking region for native
genome context.
A schematic illustrates the workflow described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 (Fig. 3-1).
In most samples, this procedure retained only 5-15% of the reads for downstream
analysis. The retained fraction is higher than necessary because we used only a single
best reference or representative genome assembly for mapping. We anticipate that
when we use all available native genomes for a species, the fraction retained should
drop substantially to the true fraction of the reads that are engineered. For example,
in the highly engineered Sc2.0 genome, this fraction is roughly 10 KB engineered / 12
MB genome, about 0.1% [30]. Of course an engineered nucleotide affects all reads that
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Figure 3-1. Host identification and native read subtraction. We used Kraken2 and
Bracken to identify taxonomic sources based on 35-mer subsequences within each read.
The top species was chosen as the native host. The corresponding GenBank assembly
denoted as the RefSeq “reference” or “representative” was then selected as the reference
genome for Bowtie2 mapping. Unmapped reads were sent to assembly.
contain it. Much of the Sc2.0 engineering comes in the form of PCRTags in which
approximately 30 nt within a coding domain are synonymously recoded to create a
watermark. Since these 30 nt will affect reads starting within roughly a 300 nt window,
the result is 10× more suspicious reads than based on recoded sequence along, or
approximately 1% for Sc2.0.
The mapping results were also used to estimate the coverage of the host genome.
We used a simple estimate calculated as the number of reads mapped to the native
host multiplied by the read length and divided by the host genome size. Although
more sophisticated methods are available, this method was suitable for our purposes
of estimating the relative copy number of suspicious contigs.
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3.4 Assembling suspicious reads into suspicious con-
tigs
Our third step was to assemble the suspicious reads into suspicious contigs. Most
assemblers use similar algorithms but optimize for different scenarios or needs: memory
footprint, CPU time, sample ploidy. MEGAHIT [31] was suggested as a robust short-
read assembler appropriate for our scenario of 30× coverage of multiple mini-contigs of
primarily fungal or bacterial origin, without complexities of high ploidy or long repeats
(personal communication, S. Salzberg). MEGAHIT performs de novo metagenomics
assembly using a succinct de Bruijn graph, where all non-branching paths become the
output contigs. Reads were assembled successfully at the first attempt. Multiplicity
of the assembled contigs was compared with the original sequencing coverage. These
comparisons were quite informative: contigs with coverage much greater than the host
tended to indicate multi-copy plasmids; contigs with coverage much less than the host
suggested dilution of an engineered strain in a native background of the same species,
which was possible in the T&E samples.
3.5 Classification of suspicious contigs as native or
engineered
The final step was to annotate suspicious contigs as engineered vs. native origin.
Sequence analysis was performed by automated BLAST [32] against several databases
available from NCBI: non-redundant nucleotide (nt), 6-frame translation vs. non-
redundant protein (nr), and UniVec database. Again for pragmatic reasons, only
the top-scoring hit was retained for each contig and database. In many cases, the
nucleotide hit and the protein hit both pointed to a single foreign content, increasing
the confidence in the annotation.
As mentioned above, reads from native genes that happen to be absent from a
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reference genome can be marked as suspicious and lead to suspicious contigs. BLAST
annotation using a full non-redundant database, rather than a single reference genome,
should identify these as native, however. We therefore removed any suspicious contigs
that matched non-engineered genomes from the host species.
Unfortunately, we were unable to fully automate the removal of contigs matching
alternative genomes from the host species because most of the genomes deposited in
GenBank lack meta-data describing the biological sample as native vs. engineered.
A logical place for this meta-data would be in the NCBI BioSample table, which
provisions a unique identifier for each biological sample. Submissions do not require
meta-data indicating native vs. engineered, however, and this information is not
reported for most samples. A single BioProject corresponds to one or more
scientific publications with PubMed identifiers (PMIDs), which can provide more
complete information about the biological samples. The PMIDs links are not always
included, however, and can be ambiguous because the link is at the BioProject
level rather than the BioSample| level. This makes it difficult to match strains
described in research publications and assembly IDs in GenBank. Thus, for many
of the matches to alternative genomes for a species, manual analysis was required
to distinguish between a match to a native gene versus a match to a foreign gene in
an engineered host, for example an integrated cloning vector or antibiotic resistance
marker.
Subsequent analysis was partially automated and involved manual sequence analy-
sis, including visual inspection of the junctions between regions of the suspicious contig
query matching native host sequence and regions of the query matching engineered
sequence. Manual analysis was also performed to identify the location of engineering
as integrated into the host genome (either based on native flanks or presence of an
integrating vector) vs. presence of a plasmid. In certain cases, literature analysis was
also used to identify the likely provenance of a strain.
22
The assembly and annotation steps described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 are illustrated
in a schematic (Fig. 3-2).
Figure 3-2. Assembly and annotation. Suspicious reads were assembled into contigs with
MEGAHIT and then annotated using BLAST against non-redundant nucleotide (nt) and
protein (nr) databases. Flanking sequence on a contig that matched a native host provided
the context of the integrated engineering relative to the reference. Matches to UniVec and
differences in copy number between the suspicious contig and the host genome identified
plasmid-based engineering (often higher copy number of the suspicious contig) or dilution
(integrating plasmid and lower copy number of the suspicious contig).
3.6 Alternatives and Improvements
3.6.1 Chronology
The methods described here were developed under time pressure. At the start of the
FELIX effort in September 2018, our assigned role within the BBN consortium was
to provide biological knowledge in the form of databases of non-engineered genomes,
obtained from GenBank, and engineered genomes, including the Sc2.0 genomes with
sequences designed at JHU [30]. We planned to advise other participants on methods,
but not to create our out method. A first round of T&E occurred with sequences
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provided to BBN in April 2019. Results were disclosed in May-June 2019.
At the June 2019 Face-to-Face meeting organized by IARPA for all FELIX per-
formers, the results we observed from all the groups, including BBN, were disappoint-
ing. Most methods had only 70-80% accuracy for what seemed should be an easy
classification problem. These methods generally followed the pattern of generating
full-genome assemblies, then annotating with existing genome annotation pipelines
or with sequence-based features extracted from comparisons of native vs. engineered
genome training sets. Unfortunately, these were the only type of methods being
developed within the BBN consortium. Notably, all of the funded efforts took a similar
approach; no groups were pursuing what appeared to us to be a more efficient and
potentially more accurate approach of first removing all the native sequences and then
analyzing what could be a much smaller data set.
After discussing our thoughts with BBN, we began work on the reads-first methods
described here in June 2019, with the knowledge that a new round of T&E data
would be arriving in August 2019 with answers due in September-October 2019. Our
goal was to construct a working pipeline end-to-end in time for T&E, rather than to
optimize any particular step. As will be presented in a subsequent chapter, our initial
pipeline, developed over approximately three months primarily by a single person,
out-performed all the other methods, which had been developed for a year by much
larger and better resourced groups.
3.6.2 Input data: short vs. long reads
As discussed above, while T&E provided short-read data for all samples, long-read
data was only available for a subset of samples. Furthermore, the estimated coverage
of the short-read data was higher than the coverage of the long-read data. Short-read
technologies remain superior to long-read technologies for error rates. Our impression
was that the long-read data was requested by groups influenced by whole genome
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assembly, in which long reads are important for linking together contigs. We therefore
postponed work on long reads.
Focusing on short reads simplified subsequent steps. Meta-genomics methods such
as Kraken2 and Bracken often assume similar lengths for each read, which is not
true of long-reads. Assembly methods for mixtures of long and short reads remain an
active area of research.
When we compared with results from other groups using long-read data (estimated
coverage 15x), there were one or two samples in which evidence of engineering was
present in the long-read data but not the short-read data. The most likely explanation
appears to be incorrect deconvolution of barcodes used for multiplexed sequencing
runs. The effort that would be required for a definitive answer may be beyond the
resources of the T&E team that generated the data, however.
3.6.3 Mapping to the native reference
For simplicity, reads were mapped to a single native reference genome. This is
problematic for two reasons. First, species do not have a true single reference genome
because gene content (not just alleles) can vary from strain to strain. For example,
the reference genome for Saccharomyces cerevisiae was generated from the S288 strain.
Gene content in the S288 strain and the CEN.PK strain differ by over 100 genes,
however. And, most importantly, they are both non-engineered, although they are
laboratory strains that were derived by selection. Our plan, which was successful,
was to permit reads for these genes to be marked as suspicious, to build them into
suspicious contigs, and then to identify them as native in the BLAST-based annotation
step. In future work, it would likely be better to use genomes from multiple strains to
identify and filter out native reads.
This brings up the second problem: GenBank has both native and engineered
genomes, and there is no clear annotation in meta-data of whether a BioSample
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(biological specimen from which the sequencing data are derived) is native or engineered.
Furthermore, in addition to the native and engineered categories, there is also a derived
category, in which cells have been subjected to classical mutagenesis with the mutants
then selected for desired properties. Some of the genomes marked as “reference” or
“representative” in GenBank are actually derived strains rather than native isolates.
The standard reference for Bacillus subtilis is a derived strain, for example. Therefore,
we also delayed work on a multiple-strain mapping reference until we could reliable
identify just native strains, as opposed to derived and engineered strains. We return




Please refer to Appendix A for decisions as well as evidence the JHU pipeline presented,
and Appendix B for the sample key table provided by T&E. Summary results and
interpretation are provided here.
4.1 Native hosts
Although the JHU pipeline is agnostic as to host species, other classifiers require
training data including samples of engineered and native genomes. Before T&E, BBN
and IARPA agreed upon three host species: Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Sce), Yarrowia
lipolytica (Yli), and Pichia pastoris (Ppa). Depending on personal preference, Sce
is better known as either bakers’ yeast or brewers’ yeast. More genetic engineering
has been performed with Sce that with all other eukaryotes put together, at least
according to literature publication counts. The fungus Yli has gained recent interest
for bioenergy because of its robust lipid metabolism, as indicated by its name. Ppa is
yeast used for industrial production because it grows to high density in batch culture.
While ‘pichia’ remains used as a common term, in fact it no longer exists as part of
formal taxonomy. Instead, all Pichia strains have been formally re-classified into two
closely related species, Komagataella pastoris (Kpa) and Komagataella phaffii (Kph).
This came as a surprise to many of the IARPA program managers and performers
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and demonstrates the fluidity of taxonomy at the species and genus levels.
The number of assemblies in GenBank varies widely for these hosts (Table 4-I).
These numbers are relevant in determining whether classification accuracy depends
on the number of genomes available as background to assess natural diversity and to
distinguish diversity from engineering.
Species Taxon ID Size (Mb) RefSeq Total
Saccharomyces cerevisiae 4932 12.2 S288C 854
Yarrowia lipolytica 4952 20.5 CLIB122 22
Komagataella pastoris 4922 9.4 ATCC 28485 33
Komagataella phaffii 460519 9.4 GS115 6
Table 4-I. A summary table of GenBank genome assemblies. RefSeq: reference strain (S.
cerevisiase) or representative strain (Y. lipolitica, K. pastoris, K. phaffii) in RefSeq. Total:
total number of assemblies in GenBank.
4.2 Host selection
Sequence data was provided for 50 T&E samples. The number of reads available for
each sample ranged from about 700,000 to over 2,000,000 (Fig. 4-1). The reads were
input to Kraken/Bracken for read-level analysis and sample-level species composition
prediction. We selected the highest predicted frequency species as the as host organism
(Figure 4-1). The JHU pipeline assigned 16 samples as S. cerevisiae, 25 Y. lipolytica,
6 K. phaffii, and 3 K. pastoris. Their identities were all confirmed with the sample
key provided.
Some of the S. cerevisiae samples had significantly greater read counts and coverage
(around 150x) compared to most of the other samples (around 40-50x) (Figure 4-1a,
4-1b). In the Bracken assignment of dominant species (Figure 4-1c), we noticed that
some of the native Y. lipolytica samples, for example Y105, Y134, and Y154, had
only around 50% of the reads assigned. The second major species that co-existed
was Y. deformans, which accounted for an additional 20% of reads. The reason
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Species Total Native Engineered TP TN FP FN
S. cerevisiae 16 3 13 9 3 0 4
Y. lipolytica 25 6 19 16 6 0 3
K. pastoris 3 3 0 0 3 0 0
K. phaffii 6 3 3 3 3 0 0
Total 50 15 35 28 15 0 7
Table 4-II. Species: known species as provided by IARPA. Total, Native, Engineered:
number of samples provided for this species total, without engineering, and with engineering.
TP, TN, FP, FN: classification performance, true positive = engineered classified as
engineered, true negative = native classified as native, false positive = native classified as
engineered, false negative = engineered classified as native. Host species also had to be
detected, and in all cases was assigned correctly.
was similar to Ppa case discussed before — taxonomic classification is entirely a
human-labeled process, which sometimes places what could be considered different
strains into different species. Furthermore, the small number of Y. lipolytica genomes
available probably under-represents the full diversity of the species. Due to large
sequence similarity shared among multiple species within the Yarrowia fugal genus, it
is nearly impossible to classify at species level for these samples in our case.
4.3 Suspicious reads and suspicious contigs
For each of the four host species, we downloaded the RefSeq Reference or Representative
genome (as of October 2019) (Table 4-I), and then built the corresponding Bowtie2
database, creating four corresponding databases. Reads from each sample were then
mapped to the database corresponding to the samples’ dominant host. Unmapped
reads, specified as SAM flag ‘4’, were collected as suspicious, with about 5-10% of
reads classified as suspicious per sample (Fig. 4-2).
While most samples had 5% to 10% of the reads marked as suspicious, the samples
Y105, Y134, and Y164 had much higher rates, approximately 90% marked as suspicious.
These were all Y. lipolytica samples. Possible reasons could include the choice of a
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Figure 4-1. Samples are ordered by dominant host species as determined by sc
Kraken2/Bracken, and for each predicted host ordered by native (green) and then en-
gineered (red). (a) Total number of read-pairs (mates count as two). (b) Estimated
coverage of the host genome. (c) Fraction of read-pairs assigned to the dominant host
species.
30
Figure 4-2. Fraction of reads that did not map to the reference genomes, customized for
each species. The spikes correspond to the three Y. lipolytica samples, Y105, Y134, and
Y164, reporting over 90% of the total reads as suspicious.
single best reference for Y. lipolytica was not representative enough of these three
specific strains. Post-analysis was performed on these three samples by mapping
those reads to all 22 Y. lipolytica assemblies deposited in GenBank. The unmapped
percentage dropped to around 83.5%. We next expanded the native database to
include all 42 genomes within the Yarrowia genus. At this point only about 5% of the
reads were suspicious, comparable to other samples. These results suggest that using
the entire native genus database instead of a species-level database could be beneficial
when the species-level under-represents the true diversity. We have not implemented
this type of expansion yet, however, due to the need to ensure that the assemblies in
GenBank correspond to native isolates rather than engineered strains.
These suspicious reads were then sent to assembly using MEGAHIT. Contig
coverage was estimated by MEGAHIT from k-mers, and the relative coverage was
defined as the ratio of the contig coverage estimated from k-mers to the host coverage
estimated from read mapping.
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Figure 4-3. Statistics of the suspicious contigs. (a) Total number of suspicious contigs
assembled. (b) Total length of suspicious contigs, as an estimate of the length of the
suspicious region. (c) Maximum length of suspicious contigs, as a measure of the assembly
quality.
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4.4 Contig annotation and classification
The resulting assembly were BLAST against non-redundant nucleotide, protein and
vector databases. We noted that of the many suspicious contigs we obtained, only
a handful few had hits in the database, which allowed for manual inspection at this
point. In fact, after this post-processing, we retained only 10-20 contigs per sample
with meaningful annotation. The decision on whether a sample was engineered was
made following the method described in Section 3.4. Figure 4-4 shows an example
contig with foreign genetic content integrated into the host genome.
Figure 4-4. This diagram shows a typical instance of foreign gene content integrated into
the host genome. Y197, a Y. lipolytica sample, has a suspicious contig of length 4776.
flag=1 means this is an isolated contig with in-degree and out-degree equals to 0. multi
means the multiplicity or the depth of the contig. Annotation with BLAST mapped the
flanking regions (black) perfectly to Y. lipolytica chromosome E, in which the junction is
the site of the insertion. The sequence in the middle (red) matches a cloning vector with
high identity. The chimeric structure of this contig, together with coverage similar to the
host genome, indicates an engineered insertion into the nuclear genome.
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4.5 Other classifiers
We note that there are no standard methods that could serve as benchmarks for
classification performance. As part of the overall BBN effort, however, several other
types of classifiers were developed. We describe results for two general strategies:
expert knowledge, represented by targeted search, and machine learning, represented
by FAST-NA [33]. Targeted search relied on expert knowledge to define a list of DNA
sequences used in engineering. These signature sequences included cloning vectors
and selectable markers. The machine learning classifier was trained on native genomes
to build a Bloom filter (similar to a hash table thats permits collisions) of k-mers that
occur in non-engineered genomes, then flags as suspicious reads containing k-mers
that are not in the hash table.
4.5.1 Targeted Search
The short-read targeted search approach used known engineered targets identified
during targeted panel design, and re-used them directly on short-read data. First,
Illumina adapter and low quality sequences were trimmed off. Next, BWA [34] aligned
the reads first to S. cerevisiae, Y. lipolytica, K. pastoris, and K. phaffi reference
genomes, and secondly to known engineered targets. Targeted Search then filtered
reads that aligned to both a reference genome and an engineering signature using a
PostgreSQL database, with a goal of capturing only reads that crossed an integration
junction. For Batch 2 of T&E samples, an additional filter step was added to validate
a junction point in the read between the engineering signature and the reference
genome, reducing false positives from multi-mapping regions.
An additional use of the targeted search database was for an experimental approach




FAST-NA first created four contrasting Bloom filters, one for each taxon, by processing
native assemblies from GenBank. Then for an unknown sample, FAST-NA first
assembled raw reads using ABySS [35]. The resulting contigs were then aligned
against four yeast reference genomes using BWA [34]. The best alignment was found
so the host was therefore determined. All contigs that belonged to a particular taxon
were merged together into a single FASTA file. The associated contigs were then run
through FAST-NA using the contrasting Bloom filter corresponding to the host species.
The unique k-mers that did not have a hit to the Bloom filters were reconstructed
into contiguous regions for manual inspection via BLAST. Engineering decisions were
made by visualizing a histogram of region of interest (ROI) lengths in comparison to
that for native samples of that taxon, which was considered to be the background
noise level.
4.6 Classification performance
Of the 50 unknown samples provided, 35 were revealed to be positives (of which 28
were correctly classified by the JHU pipeline) and 15 were revealed to be negatives
(all correctly classified by the JHU pipeline), with overall accuracy = 0.86, sensitivity
= 0.8, and specificity = 1 (Table 4-II).
4.6.1 Performance across types of engineering
Four of the known positives had two types of engineering, with 39 total instances to
detect. Point mutations, native indels, and structural variations were more difficult to
detect than insertion of foreign genetic content.
As shown in Table 4-III, the JHU pipeline performs readily in detecting inserted
foreign gene content. The capability to detect minor genetic alterations, such as
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Pattern Sensitivity
D-P-S-I # Strains JHU Pipeline FAST-NA Targeted Search
N-Y-N-N 8 0.500 0.375 0.500
Y-N-N-N 6 0.667 0.000 0.000
Y-N-Y-N 3 0.667 0.000 0.333
N-N-N-Y 6 1.000 0.833 1.000
N-N-Y-Y 9 1.000 0.556 0.556
Y-N-Y-Y 3 1.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4-III. Performance is categorized by engineering type. D-P-S-I stands for Deletion-
PtMut-StrutVar-Insertion, where Deletion = part of the host genome is deleted or truncated;
PtMut = point mutation or small edits induced by CRISPR; StructVar = mislocalized/re-
combinant structural variant involving native genes; Insert = introduction of foreign gene
content. Patterns were organized in combinations of these engineering types, in the order
mentioned above. For instance, a pattern of N-Y-N-N means only PtMut was present,
while the other three were absent.
single base changes, is much limited. This is because during the stage of Bowtie2’s
mapping to a native genome, reads with small edits may be still be aligned. To address
some of these issues, we are planning to build a reverse comparison where a native
genome is used as query against the DNA sequencing reads of an unknown sample as
subject. This may be an effective approach to identify gene deletions, synonymous
recoding, and other small edits associated with functional relevance or watermarks.
It is still questionable, however, if these types of changes will be recognizable above
the background level of natural variation. Many yeast and bacterial species vary
substantially in gene content at the strain level, possibly making it unclear whether
a deletion is native or engineered. Watermarks created by synonymous recoding
may actually be easier to detect with a dedicated method if nucleotide sequences are
conserved among strains that carry a particular gene.
4.6.2 Performance across host species
As shown in Figure 4-5a, the JHU pipeline performed well across all host species,
suggesting that the generalizable approach fulfilled its design goals. The small per-
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formance differences between species, with better performance for Y. lipolytica, K.
phaffii, and K.pastoris than for S. cerevisiae, was due to the type of engineering
rather than to the host species: the engineering in S. cerevisiae included more subtle
single-nucleotide changes without introduction of foreign genes, whereas the the other
species were engineered primarily with foreign gene content or cloning vectors.
4.6.3 Comparison with other classifiers
As shown in both Figure 4-5 and 4-III, JHU pipeline performed the best, with the
highest accuracy and sensitivity on the two major species S. cerevisiae (16) and Y.
lipolytica (25). The performance on other two minor species is all perfect. Our JHU
pipeline also performed better than FAST-NA and Targeted Search when looking at
different engineering signatures. Specially, JHU pipeline had perfect sensitivity in
terms of detecting insertion and foreign gene content. To certain extent, it can detect
deletion and structural variant, which are more limited in the other two, given reads
covering the breakpoint junction were successfully captured in the mapping step. All
of the three methods suffer greatly in detecting point mutation or small edits.
4.7 Computational requirements
4.7.1 Identifying the host species
CPU requirements were moderate, 5-10 minutes estimated for typical 30x coverage
sequence data. Data storage was primarily for the one-time build of the Kraken2
indices. Construction of a Kraken2 standard database required approximately 100
GB of disk space. Around 50 GB of RAM was required to hold the database. Output
size was approximately the same size as the input as one line of text was generated
per read or read-pair.
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Figure 4-5. Performance is categorized by species, where each colored bar shows accuracy
(blue), precision (orange), recall or sensitivity (grey), and specificity (yellow). Bars for
precision and recall are absent for K. pastoris because all samples were native, making
these quantities undefined.
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4.7.2 Mapping native reads
CPU requirements were minimal, around 1 hour per 30x coverage data set. Disk
space to hold the FM indices used in Bowtie2 increased linearly with respect to the
input. Memory requirements peaked around 5 GB, which is available on most modern
PCs. Output size was about 10% of input size, corresponding to the fraction of reads
marked as suspicious.
4.7.3 Assembly and annotation
Assembly was quite fast, 10–15 min per sample. Annotation required more time, 30-60
min per sample for BLAST searches versus non-redundant databases. This could be
reduced by better approaches for removing native reads, for example the iterative
approach discussed for Yarrowia samples. We anticipate that future implementations
will need 1-5 min for annotation. We downloaded the offline pre-indexed non-redundant
databases (nt/nr), which together took up about 500 GB of disk space. Memory usage
was around 15 GB. Output size was relatively small — only the annotation from the
top BLAST hit was selected for each contig, and typically around 10-20 contigs had




We have presented a method that builds on robust sequence analysis and meta-
genomics computational infrastructure to predict the presence or absence of genetic
engineering from DNA sequence data. While there are no standard methods for this
application, our methods were developed in the context of a joint effort pursuing
several types of approaches. Our method had two fundamental differences from other
methods developed for this effort. First, we filtered out native and near-native reads
at the start, and then assembled the remaining suspicious reads into suspicious contigs.
The other methods first assembled all the reads and then identified suspicious regions.
The benefit of our approach is far lower CPU requirements, and possible additional
benefits in avoiding assembly errors that may be confused with engineering. Second,
rather than using training examples, our methods used traditional sequence annotation
pipelines for classification. This approach maintained good performance for species
with insufficient examples of native and engineered genomes for traditional machine
learning classifiers. In an assessment with 50 blinded Testing and Evaluation samples,
our method performed better than these other types of methods, with 0.86 accuracy,
0.8 sensitivity, and perfect specificity and precision.
Unlike machine learning methods that learn discriminating features from training
sets of known positives and known negatives, the JHU pipeline draws conclusions by
inferring engineering from sequence that differs from native genomes and by subsequent
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annotation of the suspicious content. Our interpretation is that the JHU pipeline
in general performed at least as well as methods based on machine learning. We
correctly identified essentially all engineering that involved foreign gene content or
vectors. However, the major challenge is that we have difficulty with engineering
involving only host genome sequence, such as point mutations, structural variants,
and deletions.
We note that when introducing new functions to genomes, the types of engineering
that this approach was able to detect, namely foreign gene content, appears to be
the most important to detect. Moreover, some examples of engineering in the T&E
samples, such as point mutations, may be fundamentally impossible to distinguish
from natural variations — it is likely that their sequences are completely the same.
We also note that our GRAIP design goals (generalization, re-use, automation,
interpretation, performance) were for the most part achieved.
The results from Phase 1 suggest a path for improving classification performance
for Phase 2, outlined below and already underway.
5.1 Native genome curation in GenBank
An important assumption is that the reference genomes used to filter out the native
reads are indeed native. However, many of the GenBank genomes are in fact engineered,
and even for those marked as “reference” or “representative”, some are “derived” (which
means mutagenized and then selected), and some are “engineered”. The BioSample
submission process does not enforce an explicit annotation of native diversity versus
derived or engineered. In Phase 2, we will use expert curation to classify genome
assemblies from target species as native or engineered, which could in turn be used
to develop better automatic classifiers. One interesting early observation is that
some genomes annotated as “native isolates” have sequence features that resemble
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engineering; these are primarily hospital isolates, and the features may be antibiotic
resistance markers acquired by natural processes and selected for in the hospital
setting.
For a select number of species, it should be possible to read all the publications
associated with the corresponding genomes. Curated genomes could then serve as a
gold standard for selecting native genomes. It might then be possible to train a classifier
for native versus engineered based on full text analysis and natural language processing
of BioSample and BioProject descriptions and journal articles linked through PubMed
IDs. A weakness of this approach is that many GenBank assemblies have no PubMed
links. Even with PubMed links, an assembly can be difficult to assign definitively. A
publication may describe a mixture of native and engineered genomes, for example,
making it unclear which linked genomes belong in which category. A simple alternative
approach is to use methods like “targeted search” to exclude genomes, and to require
“native isolate” in the BioSample annotation. These approaches could reduce the
number of genomes available, which underestimates native diversity.
Once a subset of genomes are identified as likely native, these could be used to
improve methods by filtering out more native reads. As described in the results, using
only a single reference genome can result in 90% of reads being flagged as suspicious;
expanding the native database to include other species-level and genus-level assemblies
can improve performance.
5.2 Long-read pipeline
In Phase 1, we used only Illumina short reads as input. The reason, as mentioned
before, is that we believed 30× coverage would be high enough to cover every foreign-
native-foreign or native-foreign-native junction. We also had practical constraints on
the time available to build a classifier. In Phase 2, we will incorporate Nanopore long
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reads as well. Because of the intrinsic error rate in long reads, k-mer approaches may
not work well for host identification. Thus, we will likely continue to use the short
reads to determine the dominant host species. We plan instead to use Minimap2 [36]
to map long reads to native genomes (analogous to the use of Bowtie2 for short reads)
and then retain suspicious reads that do not map.
Combining the suspicious short reads and long reads, we plan to use MaSuRCA
[37] the hybrid assembler to construct assemblies from the both types of reads. The
resulting suspicious contigs will then be annotated.
5.3 Iterative mapping for complex samples
To deal with mixed samples (samples containing multiple species of host), our plan
is to perform iterative host identification and native read removal. The dominant
species could be identified, its reads filtered out, and the remaining suspicious reads
re-analyzed to identify a new dominant species.
We plan to use Kraken2/Bracken to identify the major host, followed by removing
reads that are native to that host. In the next iteration, we will re-analyze the
remaining reads using Kraken2/Bracken, which will give the next most abundant host.
Reads mapping to this host will then be removed. The Kraken2/Bracken/Bowtie2
for short-read, or Kraken2/Bracken/Minimap2 for long-read, would then be repeated
to iteratively remove additional native species. This could be repeated until falling
below a threshold based on a criterion such as fraction of reads remaining, estimated




Although we have relied on expert analysis of BLAST output for the final decisions
about engineering, the process that proved most useful could be automated in part or
whole. The typical pattern of a suspicious contig involves a junction between a shorter
native flanking region and a longer engineered region. The BLAST output usually
placed the long engineered region at the top of the list of matches because longer
sequence matches give higher scores. The shorter flanking regions appeared further
down the list, or sometimes not at all if there were many matches to the engineered
region.
To automate this step, we propose a simple greedy algorithm. We will use BLAST
as before for a suspicious contig (the query) versus the non-redundant nucleotide
database (the subject). The top hit will be recorded and used to annotate the matching
region of the query. Next, we mask the matched region and re-run BLAST. This
should provide a robust approach for automated annotation.
5.5 Dedicated predictors for complex samples
Meanwhile we will implement dedicated predictors for types of engineering that may
not be readily detected. These include gene deletion (possibly by suing the host genome
as the query and the sequencing data as the subject), identification of synonymous
recoding (identifying reads that are perfect matches to host protein but poor matches
to host DNA), and other more subtle watermarks of engineering. Watermarks based
on synonymous recoding could potentially be identified as regions where the DNA does
not match the host but the protein sequence it encodes matches exactly. Tests with
the Sc2.0 genome have been successful in identifying PCRtags, which are synonymous
recoding watermarks that can be rapidly checked by PCR [30]. Engineered stop
codons in non-essential genes could be difficult to identify if similar variations occur
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at a sufficient frequency in native isolates. Similarly, engineered deletions of native
genes could also be difficult to identify because gene content can vary substantially
for different strains of the same species.
One mitigating factor is that loss-of-function created by stop codons or deletions
seems less likely to be dangerous than gain-of-function engineering. Thus, while
detecting loss-of-function may be difficult or impossible in the background of natural
variation, methods that are able to detect gain-of-function (foreign gene insertions)
and gain-of-information (watermarks) may already detect the most important types




We describe results of a computational system designed to detect engineering from
DNA sequencing of biological samples, including automated identification of host
strains and detection of foreign gene content, host structural variation and smaller
edits, and watermarks. Our initial system applied to blinded samples provides excellent
identification of foreign gene content, the changes most likely to be functional. We
have less ability to detect structural variation and small indels and SNPs produced
by genetic engineering. Future work will focus on improved methods for detecting
synonymous recoding (for watermarks and recoding) and for distinguishing engineered
sequence from natural variation.
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Appendix A
JHU Pipeline Decisions and
Evidence
Sample Engineered? Detected? What was Detected?






Y107 yes yes MG883678.1, Expression vec-
tor pCPC66;WP_000027060.1






















Y128 yes yes KU378202.1,Cloning vector
pYL2;KU378203.1 Cloning vector
pYL2, complete sequence

















Y141 yes yes WP_007048783.1 tetracycline









Y145 yes yes MG252999.1 Synthetic construct
green fluorescent protein gene,
complete cds








Y153 yes yes U14125.1 Cloning vector pSG926,
HIS4-based plasmid, complete se-
quence
Y154 yes no














Y172 yes yes WP_000027060.1 MULTI-
SPECIES: class A beta-lactamase
TEM-181 [Bacteria][Archaea]
YP_001409239.1 b-lactamase
(plasmid) [Escherichia sp. Sflu5]
Y174 yes yes













Y189 yes yes MG252999.1 Synthetic construct
green fluorescent protein gene,
complete cds
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Y190 yes yes WP_000027060.1 MULTI-
SPECIES: class A beta-lactamase
TEM-181 [Bacteria][Archaea]
YP_001409239.1 b-lactamase
(plasmid) [Escherichia sp. Sflu5]










Y199 yes yes U14125.1 Cloning vector pSG926,
HIS4-based plasmid, complete se-
quence
Table A-I. Decisions and evidence. The second column is from T&E Sample Key, revealed




T&E Phase 1 Batch 2 Sample Key
Sample Organism Engineered? Which Gene was Engineered?
Y100 Y. lipolytica yes v5 epitope
Y105 Y. lipolytica no
Y107 P. pastoris yes mislocalized GAP promoter
Y109 K. pastoris no
Y115 S. cerevisiae yes point mutation in HIS3
Y116 Y. lipolytica yes truncate NADK2, YALI0E27874g
Y120 S. cerevisiae yes m13_origin
Y121 Y. lipolytica yes ura3 distruption
Y122 Y. lipolytica no
Y123 S. cerevisiae no
Y125 S. cerevisiae yes m13_origin
Y128 Y. lipolytica yes mislocalized leu2
Y129 S. cerevisiae yes m13_origin
Y130 P. pastoris no
Y131 Y. lipolytica yes deletion of gene YALI0A19844
Y132 Y. lipolytica yes truncate NADK2, YALI0E27874g
Y134 Y. lipolytica no
Y136 S. cerevisiae no
Y137 Y. lipolytica yes v5 epitope
Y140 Y. lipolytica yes truncate NADK2, YALI0E27874g
Y141 Y. lipolytica yes Mutation to stop codons in open
reading frame (ORF) of the hap4
gene
Y144 S. cerevisiae yes delete HO
Y145 Y. lipolytica yes mislocalized leu2
Y148 Y. lipolytica yes Mutation to stop codons in open
reading frame (ORF) of the hap4
gene
Y150 Y. lipolytica no
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Y153 P. pastoris yes mislocalized GAP promoter
Y154 Y. lipolytica yes deletion of gene YALI0A19844
Y155 Y. lipolytica yes ura3 distruption
Y159 S. cerevisiae yes m13_origin
Y162 S. cerevisiae yes delete HO
Y163 Y. lipolytica no
Y164 Y. lipolytica no
Y165 S. cerevisiae yes delete HO
Y168 P. pastoris no
Y170 S. cerevisiae no
Y172 S. cerevisiae yes m13_origin
Y174 Y. lipolytica yes Missense point mutations in pro-
tein coding genes
Y175 Y. lipolytica yes ura3 distruption
Y176 S. cerevisiae yes 3bp change on gene Cdc48 at lo-
cation 105 bases into the gene so
that it codes and R instead of a G
Y178 K. pastoris no
Y180 P. pastoris no
Y187 Y. lipolytica yes Mutation to stop codons in open
reading frame (ORF) of the hap4
gene
Y188 S. cerevisiae yes point mutation in HIS3
Y189 Y. lipolytica yes mislocalized leu2
Y190 S. cerevisiae yes m13_origin
Y191 Y. lipolytica yes v5 epitope
Y195 K. pastoris no
Y197 Y. lipolytica yes deletion of gene YALI0A19844
Y198 S. cerevisiae yes point mutation in HIS3
Y199 P. pastoris yes mislocalized GAP promoter
Table B-I. Sample Key. Summary of the full information provided by T&E after the
submission of classification results.
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Engineering with a Knowledge-rich DNA Sequence Classifier
• Building a classifier that identifies bioengineered sequences in yeast genome
• Identified native host using Kraken2/Bracken and collected yeast reference genomes for Saccha-
romyces cerevisiae, Yarrowia lipolytica, Pichia pastoris
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learning and method refinement
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